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The Great Recession has called into question many tenets of Neo-classical 
Microeconomics.  Neo-classical theory allows each agent only one fixed type, homo 
economicus, while not denying other possible types as in adverse selection. We propose 
that economic agents not only choose their market basket but also their types. Agents are 
members of groups and each group has social norms to which the agent more or less 
conforms. His/her market behavior trades off private well being which responds to prices 
but also social well being which responds to norms. We show how deviation from norms 
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“Understanding human behavior requires more knowledge about the utility function – to 
understand why we care about things we care about - along with knowledge about prices, 
incomes and how we make choices. In other words, the time is ripe for combining 
biology and economics.” Donald Cox (2002)  donald.cox@bc.edu 
 
“No human societies exist without social norm, that is, without normative standards of 
behavior that are enforced by social sanctions…Thus, it is impossible to understand 




I.  Introduction 
 
The Boundaries of Neo-Classical Consumer theory: Neo-Classical consumer choice 
theory starts with the assumption that all agents have a particular type called homo 
economicus; that is, agents are both “strictly rational” and “self-interested”. In practice, 
these get embodied in well-behaved preference orderings representable by a specific 
utility function.  An economic agent displays rationality by maximizing this utility 
function with respect to goods.  The neo-classical consumer choice model considers 
preferences as given and ignores how the agent‟s preference ordering arises thereby 
effectively shutting out “society” from the discourse. This has the advantage of freeing 
the discipline of the seemingly insoluble intricacies of the human psyche that doomed J 
Bentham‟s (1871) seemingly quixotic search for the proverbial hedonimeter. From the 
utility calculus and the seemingly harmless assumption that agents are “atomistic” (i.e., 
numberless and thus “powerless”), the discipline derives neat mathematical hypotheses 
on the behavior of market prices that are for the most part consistent with observed short-
run market reality. That this model also allows the derivation of the vaunted welfare 
theorems that formalize the “Invisible Hand” in Adam Smith‟s The Wealth of Nations 
(1776) making the paradigm more compelling. 
 
It was in the beginning imperative to narrow the compass of consumer theory to price 
determination in the supply and demand space in order to achieve clarity and testability. 
The resulting “sharp predictions” and their non-falsification were then no doubt a source 
of its strength.  Note that consumer theory does not deny the role of other dimensions in 
the determination of equilibrium price; it only “curls” these dimensions into constants 
and corner points or intercepts. These constants are said to be determined somewhere else in the social and biological universe and economic agents have no choice about them. In 
the categories proposed by the eminent ethnobiologist Ernst Mayr (1976), Neo-classical 
consumer theory is an open behavioral program in respect to market baskets but is a 
closed behavioral program in respect to type.  
 
If pressed, an economist may resort to two arguments in favor of fixed preference: one is 
to say that preferences, if they change, do so very slowly as to be irrelevant to market 
outcomes. Another is to say that the changes of taste in a population tend to be random 
around the mean of the normal distribution and so effectively cancel out in large 
populations. Yet another is to say that with taste change, economics can explain 
everything and thus nothing. While probably valid in the past, these are now subject to 
reasonable challenges.  
   
Increasingly and perhaps inevitably, this overly narrow focus is being revisited and 
challenged. There is now a growing body of evidence that the homo economicus 
assumption does not stand more detailed empirical scrutiny. Pressure comes first from the 
fact that Economics as a social science is now increasingly called upon to deal with 
issues outside the narrow confines of well-developed markets. The phenomena of 
“market failure” and “missing markets” arise either in small numbers games where agents 
exercise market power or where agents are beset by information asymmetry.  The issue of 
global warming exemplifies this genre of problems. But even in well-developed markets, 
phenomena like economic bubbles and crashes, eloquently articulated by the 2008 global 
financial crisis, do not to sit comfortably with the orthodox Economics. The “cancel out” 
and the “too slow” arguments for fixed preference” struggle vainly against the headwind 
of new evidence of herding behavior. The contention in this paper is that changes in taste 
under certain circumstances can be very rapid and can be highly correlated. As Richerson 
et al (2003) put it: “Throughout most of human history, institutional change was so slow 
as to be almost imperceptible by individuals. Today, change is rapid enough to 
be perceptible.”  
 
The latter may relate to another boundary problem: the degree of ignorance and 
uncertainty. The Neo-Classical paradigm allows its actors to operate only under 
Knightian risk, viz., up to a known probability distribution. This governing probability 
distribution is assumed fixed.  By contrast, in the Knightian or Keynesian radical 
uncertainty (when neither the set of outcomes nor the probability distribution over this set 
is known) no economic or behavioral theory can be built since theory is the accounting of 
patterns and complete randomness has no pattern. It is like building a computer program 
to account for the completely random decimals of an irrational number. The program 
would be infinitely long. 
 
 However, theorists are now beginning to explore how these probability distributions are 
arrived at. In other words, we have begun the next logical step: to model the emergence 
of probability distributions which govern behavior. Not only is there imperfect 
information as to goods; there is imperfect information as to the probability distributions 
over those goods. In effect our retort to the view that allowing taste to change will tautologize Economics is:  yes if taste change is without any structure; no if it is 
structured so that one can control for it. 
 
Somehow, questions that may be rooted upon two boundary issues, viz., (i) how  
“preferences” or “behavioral tendencies” are formed and (ii) how people attempt to 
whittle down uncertainties  keep rearing their heads. The Adam Smith of Theory of 
Moral Sentiment(1771) who struggled with the question of why we value people other 
than ourselves just won‟t go away. It appears that the time is ripe for the boundaries of 




[This temptation, nay imperative, to transcend, endogenize or even discard erstwhile 
“givens” in the face of mounting anomalies forms an integral part of every scientific 
discipline (Kuhn, 1962). Johannes  Kepler‟s “ellipse” replaced the perfect circular orbit 
of Ptolemy on the basis of Tycho Brahe‟s detailed astronomical data. The dropping of 
Newton‟s “absolute space” assumption allowed Einstein to account for the negative result 
of the Michelson-Morley experiments. Increasingly, the previously sacred constants of 
Physics (Planck‟s constant, Einstein‟s speed of light and constant of universal 
gravitation) are subjected to questions of why and how (Kane, 2000, Supersymmetry).]  
 
In this paper, we will first present some of the anomalies that have emerged over the 
years and which we deem relevant to this enquiry (Section II).  In Section III, we propose 
and discuss a possible alternative, Multi-Level Choice Consumer Theory, where agents 
are viewed as open behavioral programs (Mayr, 1976) both as to type as to market 
baskets. That is they choose their type before they choose their market basket. The choice 
of type is associated with “norms” set by the actor‟s reference group. Change here is 
expected to be sporadic but dramatic. These norms, how they change and the sanctions 
associated with them are imperfectly known to the agent and imitation and mimicking are 
some of the ways to avoid sanction.   In Section IV, we formalize this alternative model 
and in Section V we discuss how it accounts for the anomalies identified.  
 
II.  Anomalies  
 
The anomalies confronting Neo-Classical consumer theory are myriads. We concentrate 
only on two categories, viz., cooperative solutions in social dilemma games and the 
phenomena of bubbles and herding most prominent in Financial Economics. 
 
1. Cooperative Outcomes in Social Dilemma Games    
 
This enquiry deals with economic agents belonging to and interacting with other 
members of a group of finite size. It is a largely non-formal market environment where 
economic agents exercise some “market power” and can and do influence the outcomes 
of social games. The most interesting subset of social games is the set of “social dilemma 
games” where the pursuit of individual self-interest tend to produce inferior social 
outcomes.  The unequivocal prediction is that strict rationality among participants in “social dilemma games” (also known as “collective action games”) will invariably fail to 
cooperate and thus forego “the cooperators‟ dividend” implied in a higher social outcome 
(Lichbach, 1996). To this genotype of games belong the following well-known 
phenotypes: the “Prisoner‟s Dilemma Game”, the “Tragedy of the Commons Game”, the 
“Public Goods Game” and the “Ultimatum Game” etc.. The implications of strict 
rationality in these games readily lend themselves to laboratory testing. Let us consider 
“Public Goods Games” for the moment. 
 
Collective Action Failure in Public Goods Game: In a Public Goods Game, N >2 
participants are given 100 units (say, pesos) and are asked to contribute c units 
voluntarily to a kitty. The total kitty is then multiplied by r > 1 by the researcher and the 
proceeds divided equally among the participants (contributor or not). Let n be he number 
of contributor and m the number of non-contributors with n + m = N. The total kitty is 
(ncr) and everyone‟s share of the kitty is (ncr/N). A non-contributor then also gets 
(ncr/N). A contributor gets [(ncr/N) – c]. Contributors get less than a non-contributors. 
Free riders prosper!  If an agent is strictly rational and knows others to be the same, each 
will contribute c = 0.  Each member then gets only his initial endowment 100 or no extra 
payoff. This result does not change even if the game is repeated a finite number of times 
due to backward induction. This is called the “zero contribution thesis.” If, however, each 
contributes c = 100, the total kitty is Ncr and each member‟s share is 100r> 100r. The 
group of rational egoists will fail to attain a higher payoff for each, a collective action 
failure! Example: Let N = 2, r = 1.5, c=100. The gross and net payoff from the kitty for 




        Table 1:  Gross Payoff (Kitty) 
  C  D 
C  300/2, 300/2  150/2, 150/2 






                Table 3:  Net Payoff (Total)  
  C  D 
C  150, 150  -25, 175 
D  175, -25  100, 100 
 
  
   Table 2:  Gross Payoff 
  C  D 
C  150, 150  75, 75 
D  75, 75  0, 0 
 Observe that the strategy combination (C,C) is not a Nash equilibrium since either A or B 
can do better by playing D. By contrast combination (D,D) is a Nash equilibrium since 
neither A nor B can profit by deviating. The Nash equilibrium coincides with “zero 
contribution” (see e.g., Olson, 1965, for a discussion of “free riding”). But clearly note 
that both A and B are better off had they both chose C with total payoff 150 versus 100! 
There is therefore a collective action failure! This outcome remains even in finitely 
repeated versions of the game. This feature of the Public Goods Games is shared by all 
social dilemma games. 
 
In the context of common property resource game, this hypothesis emerges  as “over-
exploitation” which produces the “tragedy of the commons”  (Hardin 1968, 1981).  
“Global warming” is an example of a tragedy of the commons. The contortions in and the 
ultimately half-full compromise out of the recently concluded COP 15 in Copenhagen 
(December, 2009) is a testament to the tenacity of national self-interest as hurdle to 
global cooperation. 
 
Laboratory Experiments: The Neo-classical prediction of the game outcome in collective 
action games has been tested many times under various permutations in the laboratory 
and been found falsified every time (see Offerman 1997 for a review; also Ostrom, 2000; 
2008; 2009; Richerson, Boyd and Paciotti, 2001). Voluntary contribution to the kitty is 
never zero even in repeated versions. The results here are confirmed by extensive 
experiments with “Ultimatum Games” and “Prisoner‟s Dilemma Games” (Heinrich et al., 
2004). Ostrom contemplating the evidence concludes that agents behave as if they were 
“conditional cooperators” rather than “rational egoists.” Punishment for deviants appear 
to contribute heavily to sustaining cooperation.  (Rasmussen and Hirshleifer, 1989; Boyd 
and Richerson, 1992; MacAdams, 1998; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). But punishment 
meted by members is another problem for the rationality hypothesis: the cost of 




Field Research on CPRs: The laboratory results have now been amply reinforced by 
extensive field studies under the leadership of 2009 Economics Nobel Memorial Prize 
awardee Elinor Ostrom. Although the context differ in that field research games tend to 
be repeated and face-to-face whereas in many laboratory researches, games tend to be 
one-shot and anonymous. Note however that finitely repeated collective action games 
tend to have the same sub-game perfect equilibrium as single stage versions. They have 
found again and again that groups under certain circumstances (which we will refer to as 
the “Ostrom conditions”) find ways to overcome the “tragedy of the commons” in 
common property resource (CPR) management (Ostrom, 1990; 2001; 2009). Ostrom 
(1990) has listed some of the requirements for the social environment to attain superior 
social outcomes; in particular, the game must be repeated; the game allows face-to-face 
communication (small number interaction) and the members are allowed to invest in 
monitoring and punishment of free riders; entry and exit is not easy; members are fairly 
homogeneous; the successful outcome of the game must be important enough. The 
importance of punishment, as observed above, is especially notable because punishers invest private resources that benefit even non-punishers. Thus, there is an element of 
abnegation and a violation of sub-game perfection. 
 
One can view this body of evidence as partly realizing the theoretical results due to Kreps 
et al (1982) which predict episodes of cooperation arising in finitely repeated games if 
some agents are self-abnegating (use  “tit-for-tat”  sometimes referred to as “insanity”) is 
upheld. Likewise the attainment of cooperation in infinitely repeated games require the 
adoption of contingent strategies such as the “grim strategy” of Fudenberg and Maskin 
(1986) and Abreu (1987). Contingent strategies such as tit-for-tat where agents open 
themselves up to opportunism form a fertile soil for the emergence of cooperation (see, 
e.g., Axelrod, 1984). They also are a marked departure from the assumption strict 
rationality. As Richerson, Boyd and Paciotti (2001) summarizes it: “Evidence from the 
commons literature suggests that people are neither individualist nor prosocial rational 
actors by nature.” They are instead  one or the other depending on what the situation 




    
  
2. Bubbles, Crashes, Herding and Fat Tails   
 
 
We now turn our attention to another set of anomalies, this time, from the world of 
finance and macro-economics. The anomalies here were made especially salient by the 
2008 global meltdown and the previous booms and crashes of a frequency not warranted 
by current mainstream models. 
 
In 1965, Paul Samuelson (1965) taking off from Bachelier (1900) proved the proposition 
that fully anticipated prices are martingales, that is, prices of this genre are un-
forcastable.  Fama (1970) taking a cue from Roberts‟ “weak form efficiency” (1967) and 
his own dissertation (1965) coined the moniker “efficient market hypothesis” (EMH) to 
describe the state where market  prices reflect all available information and no trading 
strategy can consistently make money.   The 1970‟s saw added theoretical impetus given 
by the results that price changes weighted by the aggregate marginal utilities of risk-
averse agents is unpredictable (Le Roy, 1973; Rubinstein, 1976). Lucas (1978)  showed 
that risk-averse agents exhibiting “rational expectations” fully embody all information 
and only risk-adjusted marginal utility discounted prices qualify to be martingales. Since 
Lucas‟ ambition to rewrite the whole of Macroeconomics based on rational expectations 
(The “Lucas Critique) was coming to fruition, Financial Economics and Neo-Classical 
Macro-economics came to be woven from the same fabric: rational expectations (RE) and 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  
 
This powerful orthodoxy bedded down snugly with such well-developed mathematical 
constructs as  “random walk,” “markov process” , “brownian motion” and “geometric 
Brownian motion”. The common attractive property of these processes is they generate distributions that all converge to the Gaussian or normal distribution of price movements 
by the law of large numbers. In this paradigm, bubbles and crashes constitute very rare 
statistical events with near zero probability of occurrence. They may well be and are 
conveniently ignored.   
 
But bubbles and crashes (booms, avalanches, cascades) refused to be so lightly 
dismissed. They occur so much more frequently than orthodoxy would have them. The 
October 1987 stock market collapse, the 1998 LTCM debacle, the 2001 dot.com bubble 
and crash, and the 2008 sub-prime bubble and collapse point to fundamental flaws in the 
orthodoxy.  
 
It turns out that more careful analysis of the process beginning with Mandelbrot‟s (1963)  
showed that asset prices do not exhibit the Gaussian distribution. Mandelbrot himself 
proposed the Levy distribution to account for the frequency of large price changes that 
would have near-zero probability under the normal distribution. He coined the phrase “fat 
tails ” to describe this leptokurtic property of distributions. Fat-tailed distributions do not 
tend to the Gaussian distribution in the limit. This is considered the source of excess volatility 
of stock returns. 
 
 
In the 90‟s, the fledgling discipline of “Econophysics” weighed in with evidence 
similarly compelling. Mantegna and Stanley (1995) showed that for a very large number 
of observations of Standard and Poor 500 index, the distribution that best fitted was the 
“truncated Levy distribution” which displays finite variance. They also found that price 
increments are correlated in time which should not be the case if the process is geometric 
Brownian and EMH is valid. Likewise, volatility fluctuates with time and is not constant 
as the EMH would have it. Gopikrishnan et al (2000) and Stanley et al (2000) showed 
that for an even greater number of S & P index observations, the log-log plot was linear 
showing a non-Gaussian power law.  What these means is that the powerful theorems of 
financial economics based of geometric Brownian motion such as Black-Scholes option 
pricing have circumscribed applicability!  
 
Meanwhile many other anomalies began to be noticed. The serial correlation of asset 
prices and the persistence of arbitrage are examples of a phenomena that shouldn‟t exist 
(Cont and Bochaud, 2000). The “Oracle of Omaha” who consistently beat Dow Jones is 
an anomaly at least according to the strong version of EMH. The first order 
autocorellation coefficient that should be falling as markets became deeper instead 
showed a cyclical variation and lower in the 50‟s than in the 90‟s (Lo, 2004). The so-
called “equity premium conundrum” where over very long periods, stock returns 
outperform other financial assets is an anomaly if EMH is true. That the Random Walk 
Hypothesis is rejected for weekly stock returns indexes (Lo and MacKinlay, 1997) is also 
an anomaly.  
 
The message here is that market participants do not act like they believe the “no 
arbitrage” condition; they instead act as if they believe that some form of strategic 
complementarity occurs in the market. In other words, market agents are susceptible to 
herding behavior.   
Economics have began to recognize the existence of herding behavior in the market. 
Models of how herding and bubbles emerge (Banerjee, 1992; Birchandani, Hishleifer and 
Welch, 1993) have been proposed and now constitute a robust subdiscipline in 
Economics. These models do not depend on irrationality to generate herding. They 
depend rather on imperfect information and the Bayesian updating of that information 
from watching others‟ actions.  
 
3. The Billion DollarAdvertising and Endorsement Industry 
 
The existence and vibrance of the advertising and celebrity endorsement industry is an 
anomaly if consumer or type is fixed and prices do not rise with the ad spend. The 
billions that Nike,  Toyota and the like spend yearly would be irrational unless there is 
some correlation between ad spending and consumer patronage. If, however, the 
perception of what is the norm changes towards the brand with adspend, it makes sense.  
 
4. Kuhnian Anomalies? 
 
For some, these conundra now constitute a body of Kuhnian “anomalies” that call for a 
shift away from the homo economicus assumption. But which of the two features of 
homo economicus, strict rationality or self-interestedness should be jettisoned?  It has 
been proposed that strict rationality in the sense of Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility and rational expectation (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1981) should be replaced by 
bounded rationality, rationality operating under imperfect information (Simon, 1955, 
1957, 1999). In Financial Economics, the “Adaptive Market Hypothesis” based on 
evolutionary perspective (Lo, 2004) has been proposed by behavioralists (Shiller, 2008) 
to replace the EMH.  The proposed alternatives do not yet constitute a consistent body of 
beliefs and research programs to adequately replace the prevailing orthodoxy.    
 
III. A Multi-Level Choice Model: Heuristics 
 
Our interpretation of the mounting evidence issuing from laboratory and field 
experiments and the turbulent world of finance is that to each agent is mapped a  non-
singleton set of  types and he/she chooses the type that he/she thinks will best serve 
his/her end in particular environment. We will assume that economic agents can choose 
their type in a calculus similar to the choice of market basket but the choice of type is 
attended by a lot of uncertainty, is episodic and occurs before the choice of market 
baskets. In other words, we hold on to agent rationality in the sense of bounded and  
based on imperfect information about the situation or environment. This we call 
“situational rationality”. The resulting decision landscape we call “multi-level choice 
theory” (MLCT).  
 
The mapping of each agent against a multiplicity of types is not a novelty in Economics. 
In the economics of incentives compatible contracts under asymmetric information 
(adverse selection), an agent „s true type is private information while others know no 
more than the probability distribution over types. In Mechanism Design, the agent has one true type but has the choice of lying about it. The problem is to devise a way to make 
the agent tell the truth. If the situation is right, the agent will pass himself off as a 
different type to attain a higher payoff. Here agent choice is limited to the type he/she 
reveals but there is no choice over his true type. We intend to go farther than this. We 
will ague that agent‟s true type itself is subject to choice.   
 
We first make the fundamental assumption (following Adam Smith‟s TMS) that every 
agent belongs to a group. In Sociology, where “Homo sociologicus” is king, the taste or 
preference of an agent and consequently his behavior is shaped by the norms his/her 
social group.  “Norms” is the most invoked concept in the social sciences (Hechter and 
Opp, 2001). Where the concept of  “deviance” is of serious academic interest, the choice 
of type is central. The implied concept here is that society has a way of keeping member 
behavior within tolerable bounds. Parents sanction deviant behavior in children. Parents 
or societies appear to have an “ideal type” or norms of behavior for each member that 
serves as the reference point for deviance. Norms is however invoked very sparingly in 
Economics although to good effect when done (Solow, 1990; Kandori, 1992; Lindbeck, 
Nyberg and Weibull, 1999). 
 
The choice of type by an agent is a quintessentially social process. Societies have an ideal 
type (norm) for each behavioral trait which impacts on social outcomes. Where such 
norms exist, deviations from the ideal are meted some penalty. Societies where most 
members choose the “ideal type” are called “coherent.”  The Japanese society is many 
times mentioned as example of a coherent society. A concept that has attained increasing 
foothold in Economics to the same end is “social capital” (Putnam, 1993) foremost 
among which, “trust”, is also a source of this coherence (Fukuyama, 1995; Fehr, 2008).  
While social coherence is usually viewed with envy by competitors in the market, as it 
can lead to remarkable performance (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997), it can also lead 
to tragic results as did the military adventurism by Japan and Germany. How do the ideal 
types get established in the group? 
 
Groups are concerned with group performance (survival in Biology) and the ideal types 
associate with the behavior patterns that best advance that performance. This 
performance becomes more compelling in situations where the group competes with 
other groups. In other words, the ideal types is viewed by the group, rightly or wrongly, 
as conferring a competitive advantage upon the group. Such for example is the trait 
“eusociality” or “altruism”  which remains a very live issue in Biology (Wilson DS and 
EO Wilson, 2007). Why do sterile females in an ant or bee colonies sacrifice their own 
procreative potential for the group? The solution according to Darwin in his other classic 
The Descent of Man (1871) is that groups with a good proportion of altruists have a 
distinct advantage over groups of mostly selfish individuals. In Darwin‟s own words: 
 
"Although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each 
individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe... an advancement in 
the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over 
another." 
  Thus in this case, ideal types are viewed as giving the group a distinct selective advantage 
and must shape member actions if need be by sanctions. In lion prides, maturing male 
offsprings who are likely to challenge for mating rights, defy heirarchical order and 
weaken the pride, are instinctively driven out by the resident alpha male. Over 
generations, members of successful groups will display an ingrained or hardwired 
predilection for group norms.  
 
The old adage “In Rome, do as the  Romans do” embodies this viewpoint like no other. 
The agent concerned, perhaps a visiting Damascene, knows there are norms of proper 
behavior in Rome. Since “doing as the Romans do” serves valuable public order in 
Rome, this is supported by sanctions. To that effect, the Roman legal principle 
“ignorantia legis neminem excusat” is very ancillary. Whoever acts in violation of the 
norms risks being punished. For most visitors to the capital of the Roman empire, this is a 
small price to pay for amenities of Rome.        
 
It is, however, one thing to accept the counsel; it is another matter to actually execute it. 
Rome is a complex web of inter-phasing social environments. Thus there is a lot of 
uncertainty attached to the simple counsel.  You can read travel guides. Or, as is most 
likely favored, you can just follow the crowd. There is safety in numbers.  You don‟t 
know the motive for nor the information which motivates  their behavior but you can 
observe the behavior flowing from those. That is called herding. Herding need not be an 
irrational behavior. If agents have imperfect information, follow the Bayes updating rule 
and depend on other‟s actions for additional information, their cumulative decisions will 
produce herding behavior and thus booms and avalanches.  (see e.g., Cont and Bouchaud, 
2000  and Birchandani et al., 1993; 1998; Banerjee, 1992; Nerei, 2008). The crucial point 
here is that value to an agent of a behavioral type depends partly  upon the reference 
group and that value is attended by imperfect information and uncertainty. 
 
An agent‟s optimal type is therefore contingent on the situation in which he/she finds 
himself/herself at a particular time. His/her choice of type is rational but situational; thus 
situational rationality. Every agent finds himself operating in two exchanges at the same 
time: one is the formal “mature market” of the textbook where exchange of goods and 
services is mediated by posted prices and thus faceless; the other is the social exchange 
market or “proto-market” where exchange is governed by norms and sanctions.    
 
 
This is a departure of some moment from Neo-Classical consumer theory where an 
agent‟s type, homo economicus, is fixed. In the categories introduced by the great 
ethnologist Ernst Mayr (1976),  Neo-Classical consumer theory is a closed behavioral 
program, one where the behavior of the organism is laid down in very great detail (strict 
rationality);  what we are propose here is, again in Mayr‟s categories, an open behavioral 
program, one where certain choices or alternatives are open.  Behavior in Neo-Classical 
theory may be described by the declaration: “These are my principles. If you don‟t like 
them, eat out heart out!”  The proposed alternative consumer theory allows the more 
strategic  declaration: “These are my principles. If you don‟t like them and you are bigger 
than me, I have others.”  
IV. Multi-Level Choice: The Formal Model 
 
Let U*(p, B; z) = V(z) be the indirect utility function of agent H where p is the vector of 
prices of the vector or market goods x, B the budget of H and z = {zj}, j = 1,2,3…,m, is 
the m-vector of non-market goods ( to include modes of behavior) that each  has a direct 
utility to H.  We normalize each of the zj to range between 0 and 1. z are not bought and 
sold in the market (missing formal markets). The use of z by H is not regulated by the 
market. Among these are those productive of positive or negative externality (e.g., the 
use of common property resource such as fishing). These are already subject to choice by 
H in orthodox consumer theory. This vector is a the pillar in the economics of “market 
failures” (see e.g., Mas Collel et al., 1995, Chapter 11). The second is the vector of 
parameters or constants reflecting “taste”,  “preference” or “behavioral tendencies”. They 
do not produce utility directly but only affect the utility of goods. This vector consists of 
black boxes imported from other disciplines and are not subject to choice in the textbook 
consumer theory.  
 
Example: In the Cobb-Douglass utility function U = Ax1
ax2
1-a, 0<a<1. Then Z is empty.  
If we let  “A” be interpreted as a function of a non-market good z (say, A = z
d, -1<d<1), 
then Z = (z)  which is now subject to choice.   (It is also worth noting that in growth 
theory, “A”, which is interpreted as the Hicks neutral technology, has been successfully 
endogenized as the “total factor productivity”. As such it depends on other primitives 
such as R & D and human capital investment which themselves are subject to choice.) 
Both “d” and “a” are behavioral markers: d because it signals that y is distasteful (-1) or 
desirable (1) directly and “a” because it affects the relative desirability of the x‟s. But 
neither of these are observable. The parameter “a” forms the boundary between classical 
consumer economics and other disciplines. It may happen that “a” is not known with 
certainty by the agent. The value of “a” is instead revealed to the agent by how others 
react to “a” as manifested by his group‟s reaction. If x1 is “baby food” and the agent is a 
father to a baby, then a higher “a” (a higher expenditure on baby foods) will be applauded 
by his group but a zero will be viewed as irresponsible. He will not be insensate to such 
regard. 
 
Assumption 1: Every agent is a member of a reference group operating in external social 
environment E . E ε Ω, the set of all possible external environments. This group assigns 
an ideal type z* to each  member for each environment E  in Ω.  
 
Let zj be an element of the set, not necessarily a singleton, Zj . Let Z be the Cartesian 
product of all the Zj‟s, i.e., Z = ∏Zj,  the m-dimensional unit space of traits. Let Z be 
closed, compact and convex. For each member, the group identifies an “ideal type,” z*, 
z* ε Z. The type z* is a bundle of traits which maps into a behavior pattern that 
maximizes group welfare such as success in the environment E. Note that z* is different 
for different elements of Ω. An example of a trait is “cooperativeness”. This can range 
from “completely cooperative” (0) to “completely uncooperative” (1) with combinations 
in between.  The collection z* is established by group selection on cultural variation 
(Richerson, Boyd and Heinrich, 2004).   
 
Assumption 2: H chooses a z ε Z for each E.  
 
To fix ideas, let zj be the trait “cooperativeness” and let zj = 0 be most cooperative (least 
selfish in specific instance may also be construed as zero carbon emission or no smoking 
where more is individually preferred to less). This means that (∂V/∂zj) > 0, or a higher zj 
raises private well-being at the same time that it reduces social welfare. There is a 
conflict as is the case in social dilemma games. 
 
Assumption 3: There exists a penalty function C({hj}) where hj = (zj- zj*), giving the 
sanction attached to every deviation by H from the ideal level zj*. If hj =  -(zj- zj*), we 
call C({hj}) a reward function.  We assume C(.) to be increasing and convex in hj. The 
level of the penalty (reward)  rises the greater the distance is from ideal.  
 
For convenience of treatment, we let  
 
                   C({hj}) = ∑cj(zj-zj*)
2,  where cj = cj(1) + cj (2)   
 
We call the vector [c, z*] the norm enforcement environment. The term cj (1) > 0 is the 
“conscience  cost”  parameter  of  deviation  in  trait  j,  or  the  degree  at  which    agent  H 
internalizes  the  social  cost  of  deviation  (analogous  to  what  North  calls  “first  party 
enforcement”). This cost parameter comes from the “hardwired” valuation by the agent 
of group welfare. This is akin to Crawford and Ostrom‟s (2005) “delta parameter” which 
reflects the internal valuation of group welfare embodied in the agent. High level of 
“trust” among the members redounds to high cj(1) (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 
1997). This value is hardwired through inheritance or learning again by group selection 
on cultural variation (Richerson, Boyd, Heinrich, 2004) . 
 
By contrast, cj(2) > 0 is the group-institutionalized sanction parameter  (referring to what 
North calls “second party enforcement”). The term cj(2) is parametric to the individual 
but potential a choice variable to the group. The more important is zj for group welfare, 
the higher is the corresponding cj (2). For non-crucial zj, cj(2) may be zero. This reflects 
the liberal democracy‟s (JS Mill) principle that every member is free to act for as long as 
his action doesn‟t generate a negative spillover for society.  Let c be the m-vector of cjs 
and h
T be the transpose of the m-vector of deviations. 
 
A.  Deterministic z* 
 
When z* is known with certainty, individual welfare F is defined in analogy to “Inclusive 
Fitness” in this way: 
 
F(z) = V(z) – C(z) = V(z) -  ch
T  
 This is a formal rendition of what Ostrom (2009) calls bounded rationality. The agent 
chooses his optimal type z^ by maximizing F with respect to z. For twice differentiable 
and concave V(z), z^ is given implicitly by the following m equations: 
 
((∂V(z^)/∂zj) /2cj) = zj^ - zj*,   j=1,2…,m 
 
When V(z) is linear in z (the simplest case), the following are true: 
 
(a)  zj^ - zj* > 0 since ∂V(z^)/∂zj > 0:  when the trait zj is privately beneficial for the 
agent, he/she tends to exceed the ideal for finite c. (An analogous minimization 
problem results if ∂V(z^)/∂zj < 0, or zj is privately distasteful to the agent, and 
∂C/∂zj > 0, or the group rewards undertaking zj.. In this case F(z) is minimized and 
zj^ - zj* < 0, or zj^ will fall short of zj*).   
 
(b) As cj rises, zj^ -zj* falls: the deviation from ideal norm falls as its cost rises.  
 
(c) As cj→ ∞, even small deviation from the ideal zj* becomes prohibitively costly 
and avoided.  
 
(d) As zj* rises,  zj^ also rises. 
 
(e) F(z^(c, z*)) is the best the agent H can realize at any given norm enforcement 
environment [c, z*]. 
 




Assumption 4: The ideal z* and the optimal z^ changes as we move from one external 
environment in Ω to another.  
 
The rate of change depends upon the rate of change of the environment and the speed 
with which this is communicated and processed by the members.  This rate may have 
risen for example with new technologies (SMS, say). 
 
 
Genetically programmed or instinctive altruism manifested by for example sterile females 
in the bee or ant colonies is mimicked here by c(1) approaching infinity. This internal 
alignment  is  genetically  (biochemically)  enforced.  Thus,  there  is  no  deviation  at  all. 
Among humans, the Japanese samurai ethic, the Bushido, exemplifies a behavior type 
that  is  culturally  hardwired  and  internally  enforced.  In  this  ethic,  the  ideal  z*  under 
certain circumstance calls for self-immolation (hara-kiri) for the sake of the group. When 
this is true of all members of a society, the order that prevails does not require external 
sanctions which may be costly.  
 
 The optimal zj^  rises  as zj* rises.  An invasion by  an  alien  group that threatens the 
survival of agent i‟s group raises the ideal zj* (where the trait, say belligerency, raises 
group capacity to resist and repulse the intrusion) leading the individuals to raise zj^ and 
resulting in higher member patriotism and belligerency.  
 
Where c(1) is low or zero at the outset, greater coherence can still be enforced by group 
sanctions manifested by higher c(2). Group sanctions can however be very costly for the 
group and thus be limited. There is evidence for example that the larger is the group, the 
harder is the attainment of cooperative outcome. If the member can exit the group easily, 
group-imposed sanctions will not bite. Thus, the Ostrom conditions can be understood as   
lowering the transactions cost of punishment leading to higher c(2) and closer to norm 
behavior. If c = 0, then members act as they please and social disorder or entropy rules. 
For some traits, there may exist an interval around zj* where cj = 0, that is, some freedom 
to roam or experiment is tolerated.  
 
We consider the case where zj is a socially relevant non-market good such as the use of a 
Common Property Resource. Then the ideal zj* will reflect the ideal sustainable usage by 
the agent as seen by group wisdom and arrived at by repeated practice. If punishment for 
deviation c is high enough (as in the Ostrom environment due to identification with group 
goals cj(1) is high), face-to-face and repeated small number interaction, homogeneous 
membership, allowance of punishment for deviants leading to high cj (2)), every agent 
will approximate the ideal usage and the tragedy of the commons will be avoided. If c is 
very small (large number of members, high cost of sanctions, heterogeneity and so less 
identification with group goals) deviations will be large and the commons tragedy rears 
its head. If his/her group realizes that a more stringent norm better serves group welfare 
in a changed environment, then it will reduce zj* and zj^ will also fall for given c. The 
increase in the sanctions attached to smoking in public induces smaller zj^. Thus, the 
emergence of the cooperative solution in CPRs is easily follows from this narrative.  
 
 
B.  Uncertain z* 
 
It is our contention that zj* is only imperfectly known to the agent, that is zj* is a random 
variable  with  the  distribution  function  only  imperfectly  (provisionally)  known  to  the 
agent.  Let the (provisional) density function of the distribution of z* be f(z*). If the 
distribution the zjs are independent of each other, then the expected fitness of the agent is  
 
E{F(z)} = V(z) - ∑{∫cj(zj – zj*)
2fj(zj*)dzj*} 
 
Then the optimal z^ will be given implicitly by the following m equations: 
 
((∂V(z^)/∂zj)/2cj= ∫[(zj – zj*) + ((zj – zj*)
2/2)(fj‟(zj*)/ fj(zj*))] fj(zj*)dzj*,  j = 1,2,…,m 
 
Once more, the right hand side is defined over (zj-zj*) and the behavior with respect to cj 
is similar. Note that if the probability distribution over z* is degenerate, this reduces to 
deterministic case above. The added insight is that now zj^ depends upon the provisional density function f(z*) and its slope f‟(z) which in turn depends upon the information set 
of the agent. How this probability distribution evolves can generate herding behavior 
which in turn generate bubbles and crashes.  
 
 
V. Accounting for Anomalies  
 
a.  Conditional Cooperation: 
 
If agents have a choice over types, then they can parlay different types to suit their 
perception of emerging environment. Their reading of the environment depends upon the 
information set they have. If his/her information indicates that the counter-party (the 
environment) will respond selfishly, then choosing type “selfish” is best reply. If there is 
some probability that my counter-party will match generosity with generosity (i.e., 
reciprocal type), he may choose type “generous” (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2002; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). Zero 
contribution in public goods game under anonymity arises because the parties assume 
their counter-party to have no choice but to act selfishly. This will not necessarily happen 
if parties know their counterparties have a choice.  
 
This change in the chosen  types due to environmental change is manifested  in “tit-for-
tat ” or “grim strategies” in repeated games: the agent chooses the “cooperative type” in 
the absence of new information and so continues for as long as one‟s cooperation is  
reciprocated.  Once the other party reneges,  a new environment emerges where the 
opportunistic type is favored. This leads to full cooperation in infinitely repeated games 
(folk theorem) (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Friedman, 1972) and episodes of partial 
cooperation in finitely repeated games (Kreps et al., 1982, the “Gang of Four theorem”).  
Note that the change in behavior (type) is triggered by a change in the environment. The 
ideal behavior or norm operative in different environment is different. Altruism is 
applauded when directed to members of the group but may be condemned when directed 
to potential enemy. The animosity against so-called “collaborators” after WWII reflected 
such condemnation.  
 
The agent is responding to the changing environment (the revealed entry of opportunism) 
by adopting a type that reduces the cost for that new environment. If players can each 
choose their type and this is common knowledge, there is ample room for cooperative 
outcomes. In other words, Ostrom‟s “conditional cooperators” will prosper. 
 
 
In this connection we propose the concept of the Ostrom Space:  the social neighborhood 
where the probability of the counter-party being reciprocal is high enough so that 
choosing the reciprocal type is at least a weakly dominant strategy. Within the confines 
of the family group, a member‟s altruism has a very high probability of being 
reciprocated and so altruism will normally dominate. In small close-knit communities, 
agents readily take on a conditional cooperator type rather than the opportunistic type 
since the loss attached being reciprocated with selfishness is almost sure. There are times when the Ostrom space encompasses the whole nation as in times of war with other 
nations. In many primitive societies, the Ostrom space is the “tribe”. It can be as small as 
the “family.”   The stability of the Ostrom space is a live issue because it can be invaded 
by exploiters (see Henrich, 2002). 
 
As the collective grows in size, the group outgrows its Ostrom space and (1) the internal 
impulse to cooperate erodes and (2) the capacity to monitor and mete punishment on 
deviants erodes (c(2) falls). The centrifugal forces take over. Opportunism rises and 
collective action failures emerge.  
 
b. Herding and Fat Tails 
 
How does MLCT deal with the existence of herding and “fat tails”? It is in the choice of 
type based on the agent‟s reading of the new environment that herding and fat tails 
emerge. Suppose  z* is  known only up to a probability distribution which is evolving in 
view of the fact that the ambient environment and/or the information set is dynamic,  the 
agent‟s reading of the environment  and thus his choice of type zj^ could very well be 
accompanied by imitation and mimicry leading to herding behavior. It has been shown 
that herding behavior generates non-normal distribution (Cont and Bochaud, 2000; 
Eguiluz and Zimmerman, 2000; Nerei, 2008). The basis of practically all the work here is 
“imperfect information” about the probability distribution, the extraction of information 
from other members‟ actions and Bayesian updating by agents. Nerei (2008) puts the 
problem of excess volatility or fat tails in financial returns in this way: 
 
“There has been a long quest for the explanation for the anomaly [of excess volatility]. A 
traditional economic explanation for the excess volatility of the volumes and returns relies on 
traders’ rational herd behavior. In a situation where a trader’s private information on the asset 
value are partially revealed by her transaction, the trader’s action can cause an avalanche of 
similar actions by the other traders. This idea of chain reaction through the revelation of private 
information has been extensively studied in the literature of herd behavior, informational cascade, 
and information aggregation. However, there have been few attempts to explain the fat tail in this 
framework.”  
 
Nerei then proceeds to show that the chain reaction of information revelation leads to the fat-tail 





Nerei models  a large number of traders who choose whether to buy one unit of the asset or not 
to buy at all. They each receive imperfect private information on the true value of asset. They are 
also able to observe the actions of others which convey information on their underlying private 
information.  The resulting rational expectations equilibrium is a mapping from the space of 
private information of all traders to the aggregate actions. The larger the aggregate action 
becomes, the   higher is the traders’ subjective belief that the asset value is high, making the buy 
decision more likely. Thus, the traders’ actions become positively correlated and there emerges a 
perfect strategic complementarity in the actions of agents. That is, the payoff to shifting rises as 
more and more people shift. In this case, the agent shifts from being  a fence-sitting type to a true 
believer in high asset value precipitated by a shift in his probability distribution incorporating in a 
Bayesian fashion information from actions of others around him.  
 The case of choice over type is analogous. Consider a choice between two types: conservative 
and aggressive. The agent is initially conservative. New information concerning the environment 
is starts to flow. He/she decides whether to stay conservative or shift to being aggressive in view 
of the emerging new information about the environment. His private information about the change 
in environment is imperfect.  He can observe and use other agents’ actions as cues but cannot 
observe their private information. The more people are observed to adopt the aggressive type the 
more likely is it that aggression is the new normal in the sense of social sanctions being attached 
to being at variance with it. If he fails to shift when everyone else does, he/she sticks out and/or 
gets punished (realizes less profit if a commodity trader or ostracized as was erstwhile flying hero 
Charles Lindberg who opposed the entry of the USA into the WWII). If he/she shifts type but the 
majority stays, he/she gets punished (suffers heavy losses as a wild speculator or dunced as a 
“war freak”). This state of affairs creates a strategic complementarity leading to herding and 
cascades. The more people adopt, the higher is the cost of not adopting. These imply rapid 
changes in behavioral tendencies which in turn lead to sometimes drastic changes in market 
outcomes. In the hey-day of pre-2007 bubble, an investment banker was viewed as a loser and 




VII. Neo-Classical Theory as a Special Case 
 
Neo-classical consumer theory despite its weakness had many triumphs. How does Neo-
classical consumer theory fit in with this view? Neo-classical consumer theory assumes 
that the set of types  confronting each agent is a singleton. He/she has effectively no 
choice over his/her type. Multi-level choice theory says each agent confronts a set of 
types  with  more  than  one  elements  and  he/she  chooses  his/her  type  from  that  set 
depending on the circumstances.  He/she may shift types depending upon his/her reading 
of the social environment and his/her group‟s best interest in that environment. Neo-
classical consumer theory is therefore a special case of multi-level choice where neither 
the environment nor the information set is allowed to change. How do the theorems of 
Neo-classical  Economics  fit  in? These theorems  are generally valid under the  ceteris 
paribus proviso. The theorems will still hold if we expand the  ceteris  paribus set to 
include the profile of agent types. In MLCT, the validity of these theorems as social 
statement will be of shorter duration than when types are fixed.  
 
Example:  Again  let  U  =  Ax1
ax2
1-a,  0<a<1,  Z  =  (A,a)  where  “A”  is  just  a  blowup 
parameter and the exponent “a” is properly the taste parameter. Suppose   x1 a home good 
and x2 is imported. Under initial presumptions that both goods are produced under ethical 
conditions, “a” takes the value an^ reflecting an* giving the demand for each at given 
prices. After it becomes public knowledge that x2  is produced using child labor (change 
in E), the normative ideal a rises from a*  to aw* and a^ now takes the value aw^  > an^. 
Then the demand for good x2 falls while the demand for x1 rises without any change in 
the prices. If the sentiment is widespread enough, the price of x2 may fall. Shifting norms 




In the following pages, we reviewed the set of empirical observations that Neo-Classical 
consumer  theory  based  on  the  homo  economicus  with  fixed  preference  cannot comfortably account for. Two genres are especially compelling: one, the prevalence of 
conditional cooperative behavior in laboratory experiments and field studies and second, 
the frequency of financial bubbles and cascades that can only issue out of “fat tailed 
distributions” generated by herding behavior among market agents. 
 
To account for these anomalies, we propose a multi-level choice theory where (a) agent 
type is not fixed but rather chosen from a set of types, (b) each agents belongs to a group 
that prescribes the ideal type for the agent, (c) deviations from the ideal elicits sanctions 
which are either “hardwired” or “institutional”, that is, explicitly meted out by the group. 
The agents then maximizes what amounts to an “inclusive fitness” utility function to 
choose his/her optimal type. Thus, an agent may choose reciprocal behavior when the 
likelihood of reciprocity in  his counter-party is  high;  he will choose selfish behavior 
otherwise. In other words, he/she assesses the situation or context of the game. This 
makes for cooperative behavior dominant in certain social neighborhoods called Ostrom 
spaces.  The  ideal  types  are  only  imperfectly  known,  i.e.,  only  up  to  a  provisional 
probability  distribution.  Agents  look  to  others‟  actions  as  cue  to  the  true  probability 
distribution and follow a Bayesian updating. This  means that the shifts in types may be 
governed by herding behavior that give rise to “fat tailed” distributions.     
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